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There are two polar views of abortion. From the extremity of the 
liberal quarter, abortion is seen as a private patient-physician decision 
based exclusively upon the desire of the woman to become unpreg-
nant. From this perspective, the abortion decision is simply unrelated 
to questions of morality or of our social system's regard for the value 
of human life. Rather, the individual decision to abort is seen as being 
of much the same quality as the desire to rid oneself of an unwanted 
feature. Certainly, abortion is viewed as being orthogonally related to 
the evolution of social ethics (e.g., the 1973 Supreme Court construal 
of its abortion decision as falling under the "right of individual 
privacy"). Extreme liberalism casts abortion as " just getting 
unpregnant. " 
From the extreme conservative viewpoint, abortion is a human life-
taking enterprise. Since legalization of abortion is the legalization of 
human life-taking, abortion is a wedge that consequently tarnishes or 
imperils the degree to which human life is held sacred in our society. 
Some writing from this perspective views abortion as the possible start 
of a misanthropic holocaust (e.g., Diamond, 1977).1 
Curiously, if the issue under consideration were to be switched 
from abortion to capital punishment, an almost complete " flip-flop" 
of the conservatives and liberals might be observed. The same argu-
ments that the conservatives advance against abortion rain from the 
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mouths of liberals, while the opposite obtains for many conservatives. 
Many liberals point to a "foot in the door" anti-life mentality when 
they argue against capital punishment, and refer to the quality of life 
for the mother when they stand for the sacrifice of the life of her 
issue. On the other end of the spectrum, many conservatives use the 
same wedge argument against abortion, but similarly refer to the 
quality of life for the living (or, perhaps, justice for the victim) when 
they seek the death of a felon. Elements of both camps are, there-
fore, not adverse to taking some human life, nor in invoking the 
"quality of life" argument to justify their respective position. Further, 
they both employ the wedge argument, albeit at different points along 
the life-cycle. Conservatives argue that the taking of innocent human 
life puts the wedge in motion, but that the destruction of guilty 
human life has no such effect. Liberals contend that the wedge is 
unaffected by the destruction of nascent human life, but begins to 
proceed with the taking of full-fledged life, guilty or not. 
A third, less complex model competes for attention in the debate. 
This viewpoint, often dubbed "pure pacifist," casts human life as 
sacred, ignores the fine distinctions and fine exemptions of both the 
conservatives and liberals, and sees both abortion and capital punish-
ment as wedges leading to further misanthropy and human life-taking. 
A relatively well-known statement of this position was made by 
Senator Hatfield during the Vietnamese War when he opined that: 
Abortion is a form of violence. That is the undeniable reality. It is the 
destruction of life. It furthers the dehumanization of life. It cheapens life . 
There is no single characteristic of our society that troubles my inner self 
more than the degradation, the cheapening, the dehumanization of life that 
we see all around us today. That is what is at the h eart of the terrible 
inhumanity of our policies in Indochina. Human life became cheap, and 
eas ily expendable - especially Asian life, which somehow seemed less 
valuable than American life . We justified policies by talking about body 
counts. And we destroyed all sensitivity to the sanctity of human life. That 
is what happened at Attica. That is what happens wh enever we heed the 
frightened and vengeful pleas fo,· "law and order" that would have us crush 
the lives of others. The same holds true for capital punishm ent. The State 
cannot be so arrogant as to take away that ultimate right of every citizen 
- the right to life. . We have suffered so many assau lts on the sacredness 
of human life that our conscience is insensitive and numb. 
The pacifist position links abortion, capital punishment, war, and 
preparation for war as mutually supporting thrusts against the value of 
human life in a society. 
The wedge argument advanced by both the liberals and conserva-
tives "dips into" the pacifist position for support. Both conservatives 
and liberals cite various major theoriticians of the pacifist position 
(e.g., Jesus, Ghandi, Martin Luther King, Jr., St. Francis, Schweitzer) 
to buttress their particular wedge argument while neglecting the over-
all thrust of the pacifist position. Further, numerous less extreme posi-
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tions have been taken by both liberals (e.g., Denes's, 1976 "Abortion 
Is an Unfortunate Last Resort Method of Birth Control")2 and con-
servatives (e.g., Lincoln's, 1975 "Why I Reversed My Stand on Laissez-
Faire Abortion"). 3 
Marxists advance the fourth major analysis of abortion. For them, 
abortion's legalization is contingent upon capitalist society's need for 
members. In the newly capitalist societies of the 17th through 19th 
centuries, being surrounded by markets resulted in a general need to 
expand the workforce. Thus abortion was made illegal in the U.S. 
around 1825-1845 because she was in an expansionist phase of capital 
accumulation and marketing possibilities. The 1973 reversal is seen as 
a similar response to a now declining need for workers, due to 
increased competition from other countries and the displacement of 
human labor by mechanization. Capital punishment, from the Marxian 
standpoint, is wrong because it is disproportionately exacted from 
political activists and the poor. Marxists are not pacifists, but inveigh 
against capital punishment as crimping polarization and organization 
of society along Marxist lines. Marxists are not opposed to capital 
punishment per se (all of the major Marxist parties went along with 
some of the executions in the early years of the USSR), and tend to 
be neutral to somewhat supportive of abortion's legalization (in the 
U.S., the Socialist Workers' Party, a Trotskyite version of Marxism, has 
recently campaigned for the right to abort; the Socialist Labor Party, a 
fundamentalist, De Leonist version, has been neither particularly 
enthusiastic nor unenthusiastic about abortion). Marxism does not 
buy into the wedge argument and posits no necessary link between 
any given human-life-taking activity and other human-life-taking 
activities. Rather, oversimply put, each social policy, although linked 
to every other social policy, is "tied" by economic rather than "how is 
human life treated" bonds. 
The liberal, conservative, and Marxian schools of thought agree 
upon the necessity and desirability of war under certain conditions. 
The pacifist position finds the value/sanctity of human life in danger 
from many quarters, including militarism, war, abortion, and capital 
punishment. A summary of their positions, issue-by-issue, is sketched 
in Figure l. 
The Marxist perspective is borrowed from by some in both the con-
servative and liberal camps. In commenting on the state of California's 
non-funding of Medi-Cal abortions the Los Angeles Times opined that 
"abortion, which should be a private choice for each woman, becomes 
a public issue because ... some people don't have the money to pay 
for medical treatment that better-off people can afford. As a matter of 
public policy, our nation has said that the poor shall not suffer in this 
manner. Abortion is medical treatment .... There is always the argu-
ment that we hate to make - that it will cost the state more in welfare 
costs to bring up many of the children who will be born if state abor-
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tion aid is cut off .... As the legislature moves through its delibera-
tions, it must remember that any society is judged by the manner in 
which it treats its weakest members. If law makers can punish one 
group today, whose rights will they abridge tomorrow?" (June 30, 
1978). Further, after the non-funding took place, " ... the legislature 
has committed an act of willful brutality. The harsh and arbitrary con-
ditions that it has imposed on abortion eligibility for women under 
the Medi-Cal program smack of political gutlessness, medical ignor-
ance, social irresponsibility and moral vindictiveness .... Most people 
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think state-funded abortions for women who could not otherwise pay 
for them are a good thing . . .. And so the legislature, putting aside 
what is right, what is decent, and what is socially necessary, has moved 
California backward . .. . There is a fundamental and inescapable 
injustice in this situation, an injustice that in its flagrancy and con-
tempt for individual rights sickens the spirit and depresses the mind" 
(July 7 , 1978). 
While this rather shrill argument issued from the liberal camp, 
clearly only a few words would have to be changed to make it a "pro-
life" statement (i.e., casting the "weakest members of society" as 
being the fetuses rather than poor women ; considering the "punish-
ment" being exacted of helpless fetuses rather than poor women, 
etc.). Further, in addition to the cost-accounting analysis, the Times 
salvoed from all moral barrels (e.g., "decent," "right," "socially neces-
sary ," "contempt for individual rights"). Also, there are appeals to a 
kind of empiricism ("most people think," "abortion is medical treat-
ment") which, from the right-to-life quarter, would be made with the 
same, but opposite, force (e.g., Noonan, 1973, interpreted the Univer-
sity of Michigan's Institute of Social Research poll as finding 58% in 
favor of strict control of abortion). 4 
While for Marxists nothing transcends economics, the liberal, con-
servative, and pacifist positions claim to have noted underlying social 
psychological truths that transcend the kind of economic system the 
individual inhabits. The liberals hold that abortion, being the destruc-
tion of, at worst, only potential humanity, has no real bearing upon 
other possibly lethal social policies. Yet capital punishment, involving 
the exacted death of a real person, has direct bearing on the possible 
growth of lethal social policy. The conservatives declare that abortion, 
being the destruction of innocent human life, bears upon other pos-
sibly lethal social policies. Since capital punishment is exacted of only 
the guilty, it does not have any relationship to the possible growth of 
lethal social policies toward the innocent. The pacifists claim that 
human life is all of a piece, and that the destruction of any part 
imperils the existence of every other part. Therefore the kinds of men-
tality apt to be created to "handle" either capital punishment or abor-
tion ought to make the other more possible, and be associated with 
diminution of the value of human life. 
The arguments from each of the three non-Marxist camps are 
plausible, but none is flush with empirical evidence to buttress its 
analysis. Yet each appeals to a kind of empiricism. For instance Woga-
man (1975), writing from an extreme liberal stance contended: "I sup-
pose anybody could locate many people who combine advocacy of 
liberalized abortion with disrespect for the sanctity of life in general. 
. . . But would it not be equally easy to find people with a deep 
abhorrence of war and other forms of social violence [supporting 
abortion] ? . .. The abortion debate is not really between one group of 
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people who are committed to the sanctity of life and another group of 
people who have regrettably become callous and selfish." 5 Here, 
Wogaman contends that if he were to apply some standard of "respect 
for human life," approximately the same proportion or amount of 
respect would attend those who supported and those who opposed 
abortion. Further, he implies that the women who have abortions do so 
out of no less concern for the value of human life than those who do 
not have abortions. "Whenever it is implied that abortion is proposed 
out of a cheapened attitude toward life, it must be replied that this 
simply is not so. Those of us who concur with the Supreme Court's 
decision regard it as a landmark of humane spirit and practical 
wisdom. The Los Angeles Times also made empirical claims (e.g., 
"most people think") and other spokespersons from other positions 
could be cited who make similar quasi-empirical claims (e.g., Sobran, 
1978),6 but the glaring fact is no set of reasonably gathered evidence 
to support claims of lethal tied ness or non-tiedness exists! Assertion 
- louder and longer - is made to carry the weight of the argument 
(the Los Angeles Times editorial finds a parallel in almost any issue of 
the Right to Life News). A number of ethicists have noted this 
empirical lack. For instance, Patrick Coffey, 7 in critiquing the wedge 
argument as it is employed in the euthanasia debate, cited the state-
ments of Beauchamp (1977): 
If for example, rules permitting active killing were introduced, it is not 
implausible to suppose that destroying defective newborns (a form of invol-
untary euthanasia) would become a common and accepted practice, that as 
population increases occur the aged will even be more neglectable and neg· 
lected than they are now, that capital punishment for a wide variety of 
crimes would be increasingly tempting, that some doctors would have 
appreciably reduced fears of injecting fatal doses whenever it seemed pro-
pitious to do so, and that the laws of war against killing would erode in 
efficacy even beyond their already abysmal level. 7 
Coffey also cited the statements of Sullivan (1975): "Once the respect 
for human life is so low that an innocent person may be killed directly 
even at his own request, compulsory euthanasia will necessarily be 
very near" as being based upon "gratuitous assumptions about how 
the perverse tendencies in human nature will become unleashed 
(1978)."9 Without exception, each claimant in the debate says, in 
effect, "my experience is pretty broad, and it seems to me that : 
a) being an aborter and/or standing for free choice in the abortion 
decision goes along with a disrespect for life, or b) being in favor of 
abortion/ having an abortion, is unrelated to respect for human life, 
or c) some other relationship." Human theorizing has to start some-
where, and casually observing "what seems to go with what" is a good, 
empirical beginning. But we often "see what we want or expect to 
see," and when the debate gets as heated as the abortion/capital 
punishment/militarism issue, systematic, less "personally involved" 
observation is useful. These are issues that can be graced with a more 
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systematic empmClsm. What does go with what in the abortion 
debate? What kinds of attitudes and social policy recommendations 
are correlated? Do women who obtain abortions hold attitudes toward 
human life that differ systematically from women who have not 
aborted? These are potentially answerable questions (as opposed to 
questions such as "Do fetuses think?"). The modern populace is gen-
erally disinclined to accept the assertions of a theologian (e.g., 
Wogaman) regarding empirical realities; social scientists have been 
called upon to fill this particular role. So utilizing the methods and 
techniques of contemporary social science, I and my students have 
attempted to gather the kinds of systematic empirical evidence that 
would help resolve the controversy. While I believe that our filldings 
are of tremendous importance, it would be negligent to mention a 
number of caveats before reporting our results. First, while our sample 
was large (2,251), relative to most social science studies (which prob-
ably average around 50), it is still not large enough nor widely dis-
persed enough to be dogmatic about its results. Some variability 
would be expected were more midwesterners or easterners included. 
Secondly, there is a "built-in" ambiguity in any human communica-
tion, questionnaires included. People do not always construe a ques-
tion in just the manner we expect them to, so there is always some 
linguistic "slippage." The "solution" to these problems is the same 
one scientists always invoke - larger numbers of subjects with a multi-
plicity of questions and observations. But even with these cautions ill 
mind, I believe it fair to characterize our study as a solid one, consid-
erably better than most appearing in the journals, but with ample 
room for improvement. 
The Study 
Our investigation took place over a three-year period (spring, 1976 
through summer, 1978) and included persons aged 12 through 94 
residing in Maryland, Michigan, and California; 59% of our respon-
dents were female. Generally, the questionnaire was self-administered, 
with the interviewer leaving and then coming back for it in half an hour 
or so. Since there were 60 items, and space limits the reproduction of 
the entirety, only a few will be provided to give a sense of what was 
asked. Note that the questions were cast so as to provide a range of 
options leading from repression of the social policy under question, to 
expansion of the policy. The abortion item was "In your opinion, how 
should abortion be dealt with?(Choose one): It should be illegal and 
heavily penalized; It should be illegal and lightly penalized; It should 
be generally illegal but legal when there is the added consideration of 
rape, the health of the mother, or probable birth defects; It should be 
legalized but discouraged ; It should be legalized; It should be legalized 
and encouraged when rape has occurred and/or when the mother's 
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health is endangered and/or when the child will probably be born 
defective; It should be legalized and strongly encouraged. Another 
question was "How should our society handle capital punishment?" 
(Choose one): Possible punishment ought never to include the death 
penalty; The death penalty should not exist, but life imprisonment 
that means life imprisonment should exist; The death penalty should 
exist as an option for heinous crimes, but on a case-by-case basis 
(there might be extenuating circumstances); When the death penalty is 
applicable, it ought to be applied - period; The death penalty ought 
to exist and should be applied to criminals more frequently. Another 
query was "When, in your opinion, does human life begin?" (Choose 
one): at conception; during the third month following conception; at 
the quickening, when life is felt by the mother; at the sixth month of 
pregnancy; at birth; a few days before birth; a few months before 
birth. Other items included opinions about social policy toward homo-
sexuality, infanticide, euthanasia, suicide, and fetuses which survive 
abortion. Respondents also were asked whether they had obtained an 
abortion, participated in taking human life, smoked, attempted 
suicide, how frequently they had obtained traffic tickets or gotten 
into accidents, and whether they got high on drugs or alcohol regu-
larly. 
What We Found 
Instead of listing our results as correlation coefficients as is standard 
practice in professional reports, it will probably make more sense to 
most if the relationships we found are summarized. One more word of 
caution - the correlations in the study ranged from a high of .42 to a 
low of .10. Correlations of this magnitude are about "average" in per-
sonality research (the correlation between height and weight averages 
about .50), and indicate that we are dealing with a "real" relationship 
- one to which we might profitably attend - but not that "if a 
person feels this way about abortion then we will know just how they 
will feel about capital punishment, etc." Correlations of this mag-
nitude enable us to make "better guesses" about how given people will 
register on other issues if they registered a certain way on this partic-
ular issue. For instance, those who smoked more frequently chose 
more "liberal" options regarding abortion, but plenty of smokers were 
"conservative" in their opinions regarding abortion, so that if you 
knew only that a person smoked, you would have about a 2% better 
chance of guessing what his or her position on abortion would be than 
if you just "took a shot in the dark." This may not seem like much, 
but it is the "stuff" out of which social science theories are made (and 
consider how frequently someone who believes a certain thing sur-
prises you in regard to how he or she feels about another issue, even 
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when you would "bet" that if they felt that way about abortion, then 
surely they would ... ). 
So with the above warning in mind, persons who more frequently 
chose abortion-increasing kinds of options also more frequently: 
- believed life begins at or after birth, 
- believed life ends sooner for those, either conscious or 
unconscious, living on intensive care in the hospital, 
- were willing to "pull the plug" on a five-year old (or whatever 
age) conscious person on life-support systems, 
- believed that homosexuality should be legitimized, 
- believed that suicide should be made legal and/or encouraged for 
the old or defective, 
- were willing to allow the ill or old to choose to die, 
- believed that infanticide should be practiced, 
- believed that capital punishment should exist (and should be 
applied more frequently), 
- were smokers, 
- claimed to get high on drugs or alcohol regularly, 
- claimed a lower degree of love for humanity, 
- believed that only robust premature infants should be treated, 
and 
- believed that infants who survived abortion should be allowed to 
die. 
How do our results bear upon the abortion/capital punishment/ 
militarism debate? Right off, it is clear that those who would try to 
save the life of the fetus are also more apt to be interested in saving 
the life of the felon! Further, a host of human life-saving social 
policies are "linked" in the thinking of Americans. Why is this? And 
what bearing has this upon the Judea-Christian ethic? Before proceed-
ing, a sketch of the Judeo-Christian ethic appears in order, then the 
results will be studied with it in mind. 
The Non-Mystical Components of the Judeo-Christian Ethic 
Any religion might be separated, for convenience, into two com-
ponents: the mystical and the ethic, for day-to-day social functioning. 
Religions stemming from a common basis might heatedly differ on the 
mystical components of their faith while largely agreeing on the non-
mystical elements. For instance, orthodox Jews rather sharply disagree 
with orthodox Christians on the nature of God (i.e., the "Trinity") and 
both, in turn, with the Mormon conception of God. Yet aside from 
the mystical components which appear beyond empirical testing, they 
find considerable agreement on the day-to-day, non-mystical material. 
A considerable degree of interfaith cooperation occurs by downplay-
ing the mystical differences and accentuating these ethical similarities. 
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And what are these similarities? Obviously this is a topic which has 
occupied numerous theologians and thinkers for many centuries, and 
it would be presumptuous of me to claim "This is it, period." How-
ever. I have discussed it at greater length elsewhere (Cameron, 1978b, 
1979) and feel the following captures its "essence." 
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Figure 2 
THE JUDEO-CHRISTIAN ETHIC 
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Human Life 
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EVIL 
First, it must be borne in mind that the Judeo-Christian ethic is 
oriented toward the general, not individual welfare. If the interests of 
the collectivity clash with those of the individual, the interests of the 
collectivity take precedence. Generally, individual sacrifice in service 
of the interests of the collectivity is the norm. Whenever there is a 
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choice between individual betterment and collective betterment, the 
collective choice is the "correct" one. Similarly, when either individ-
ual harm or collective harm is at issue, the individual is to accept the 
pain. 
The Good is represented in the ethic by those kinds of things/ 
activities/relationships/attitudes which tend to promote social 
cohesion and generalized human betterment (Figure 1). Thus family 
ties, friendship bonds, or acts of giving or dispersal of goods are "good 
things" because they promote bondings and reciprocities. Marriage is a 
good thing because it joins two individuals who might otherwise be 
separated into the social matrix. Further, it provides a model of recip-
rocal caring and sharing. Childbearing is likewise a good thing, because 
it concentrates parental attentions upon other humans (their 
progeny), and motivates the parents to make the world a more 
pleasant place for their children. Since a "more pleasant place" is 
more apt to be created by seeking generalized betterment, generally 
the motivations of parents are toward the good, and their actions in 
service of their children are apt to benefit most of those in society. 
Further, the habits of cooperation and accommodation that parents 
are apt to acquire in pursuit of their goals, as well as their attempt to 
model "the good" for their children, are likely to be beneficial for 
human society as-a-whole. One kind of "sin" then, is the retreat from 
good. Divorce is generally a sin, because it disunites or separates and 
models such and further, tends to lead to both personal and social 
confusion and alienation. 
The other "side" of the ethic concerns lethality. The ultimate evil is 
the premature killing of a human being or beings (that is, where man 
intervenes to take human life, rather than letting God "call the person 
home or to account"). War is terribly evil; murder is evil. Further, 
those kinds of social policies that would tend to or actually involve 
the taking of human life are also evil (e.g., abortion, capital punish-
ment, infanticide, euthanasia, etc.) . When the presence of human life 
is questionable, such as in utero, the "benefit of the doubt" is cast in 
favor of the possible life. Public knowledge of the life of the fetus is 
impossible for all but the vegetative functions. But out of concern lest 
human life be taken (which would be the worst evil) , and out of a 
sense of building cohesion and love, the fetus is entended de jure 
membership in the human community, and the Judeo-Christian ethic 
opposes abortion. 
Since each person "owns" a human life, he is to treat himself, in 
light of the ethic, as a valuable representative of humanity. As such, he 
is not to take his life, nor to abuse himself (such as by habitual over-
or under-eating, smoking tobacco, or getting "stoned" on drugs or 
alcohol). The more a person's behavior/habits tend to his own life's 
destruction or diminution, the more evil his behavior and the more he 
sins (e.g., a light smoker sins less than a heavy one). Similarly, indulg-
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ing in activities which increase the chances of endangerment to others 
is evil. Driving recklessly imperils not only self but also others' 
existence and is more evil than solitary self-abuse. Smoking while preg-
nant is more evil than smoking while not. Obviously, the line between 
self-abuse and other-endangerment is not hard and fast. A person who 
smokes around others is not only harming himself, but it appears 
highly likely that he harms those subject to his second-hand smoke. 
Further, he provides a "bad" or "evil" example for others who may, 
partially on account of being exposed to his activity, be led to "go and 
do likewise." 
While far from being all inclusive of human activity (there are no 
rules, for instance, regarding art or the flavors of ice cream), the 
Judeo-Christian ethic lays claim to a fairly heavy impression upon 
social and personal existence. Both intent and activities fall within its 
purview. Bad intent is associated with sentiments, feelings, attitudes or 
leanings which would tend to model, promote or implement either evil 
or a retreat from good. Active modeling in service of evil or retreat 
from the good is also sin. Even apart from the sin of non-belief, it is 
easy to see why everybody sins or can be considered a sinner. 
Another aspect of our study pertains. Our respondents were asked 
whether they were Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, other, or none and 
also to characterize themselves as being "very devout," "moderately 
devout," "not very devout," or "not at all devout." If the above con-
strual of the Judeo-Christian ethic is approximately correct, we 
would expect catholics and Protestants who claimed to be "very 
devout" to be trying the hardest to live up to the ethic and therefore 
register as the least sinful relative to the less devout or secularists (e.g., 
those claiming to be "none"). Twenty-one percent of Christians (we 
combined the Catholics and Protestants) characterized themselves as 
very devout (and these Christians comprised 16% of the total sample), 
while 15% of the total sample claimed to be secularists. Eighty-four 
percent of the very devout claimed to love humanity (the highest 
proportion claiming love of any of the subgroups) compared to only 
50% of the secularists who made the same claim. Accordingly , the 
very devout registered as the least lethal in their social policy choices 
in almost every area. Asked when life-support systems should be with-
drawn from a conscious five-year old, with choices ranging from 
"never" to "24 hours," the very devout registered the highest fre-
quency of "never" and secularists the lowest. The same relationship 
obtained for persons of any hypothetical age. Opinion of how society 
ought to treat homosexuality (a "lifeless" sexual orientation) traced 
the same pattern. likewise for the issues of infanticide, abortion, 
euthanasia and suicide - very devout Christians most frequently opted 
for the life-conserving and secularists for the life-ending options. The 
only exception to this rule was capital punishment. Very devout Chris-
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tians "tied" with secularists in being the most frequently opposed to 
capital punishment; Jews and less devout Christians were most fre-
quently in favor of the supreme penalty. 
In a sense, the nitty-gritty of lethality is whether one has partici-
pated in taking human life. In our culture, there are at least two 
common ways to join in. For males (mainly), there is the old standby 
- war. For females, our society provides abortion (and the armed 
services loom ahead). We asked respondents if they had ever 
"attempted to deliberately kill, had killed, or had participated in 
activities designed to kill other human Oeings." A sixth of the males 
and 3% of the females responded "yes." Very devout Christian males 
somewhat less frequently registered in the affirmative, but the differ-
ences were too small to consider conceptually significant. 
When asked "Have you ever obtained an abortion?" 13% of the 
females and 5% of the males said yes. (Oh yes, males can; notice the 
"obtained"). There were significant differences between the devout 
and less devout female Christians. "Only" 8% of the "very," 15% of 
the "moderately," and 23% of the "other" Christians admitted to an 
abortion, as compared to 21% of the Jews and 25% of the secularists. 
The Judeo-Christian ethic is evident, but hardly prepotent in these 
findings. 
Self-abuse generally traced the expected pattern. Only 13% of the 
very devout Christians smoked as compared to 33% of the secularists. 
Similarly, when asked about regularly getting high on drugs or alcohol, 
6% of the very devout vs. 30% of the secularists claimed that they did. 
No differences emerged in rates of claimed suicide contemplations or 
attempts. About a fifth of the sample reported having contemplated 
suicide at one time or another (4% of these in the past month), and 
6% of the men and 7% of the women claimed to have made at least 
one suicide attempt. 
Other-endangerment was indexed in our study by claims of reckless-
ness in driving habits and reports of numbers of traffic tickets and 
accidents in which the respondent had been involved over the past five 
years. While there was a hint that very devout Christians might be 
somewhat better/safer drivers, the evidence fit a "no difference" 
answer the best. 
The study indexed social cohesion by inquiring into the person's 
marital history. Here, the Judeo-Christian ethic "scored" fairly well. 
For those who had ever been married, very devout Christians reported 
the lowest current rate of separation/divorce (5%) while secularists 
registered the highest (19%). Fully 75% of the very devout were still in 
their first marriage as compared to 64% of the irreligious. 
Taken together, the results of the survey suggest that our construal 
of the Judeo-Christian ethic is pretty close to accurate/true. However, 
there are significant departures from expectations in regard to the 
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ultimate in human life-taking, suicide and killing. Further, the evidence 
on endangerment of others, while not substantial enough to make a 
strong case one way or the other, does not take a theory-endorsing 
direction. Some of our results can undoubtedly be explained by 
noting that even the very devout are called to many different 
allegiances, Christianity presumably being one of the more important, 
though not necessarily overriding. Further, many of our questions 
concerned whether the person had "ever" done something. People 
change, therefore it is possible that some-of the-women who had abor-
tions were not devout at the time, but subsequently became devout 
(unfortunately, I know of a number of instances where very devout 
Christians went ahead with an abortion, albeit with great guilt - small 
consolation for the fetus). 
Aborters and Capital Punishment 
Another test of the possible linkage betwen abortion and capital 
punishment is provided in the attitudes of women who claimed to 
have obtained an abortion. These are women who have separated 
themselves from the rest of femaledom in at least the particular of 
having sacrificed one or more of their fetuses . If women who have 
aborted are compared with those who have not, then we would have a 
rough index of how those particularly "advantaged" by the legaliza-
tion of abortion differ from those who are not. A more exact test 
would have been provided had we a large enough sample to separate 
those who aborted into those pleased and those displeased with their 
action. Further, just because a woman has not had an abortion does 
not certify her as a "life-treasurer" - undoubtedly there are many 
women who would have abortions if they found themselves inconven-
iently pregnant even as there are many who would not have an abor-
tion under any circumstances. So it is well to bear in mind the gross 
nature of the comparison. Since the study was done over a period of 
time in six discrete samples, each such sample might be dubbed a 
"wave. " 
To perhaps no one's surprise, women who claimed to have obtained 
abortions more frequently endorsed liberalized social policy toward 
abortion in three of the six waves of the study. But while it "makes 
sense" for people to more frequently endorse an activity in which 
they indulged, it may be surprising to know that in two of the waves, 
aborters more frequently endorsed the reimposition of capital punish-
ment! Further, in two of the waves, women who had aborted more 
frequently answered yes to the question "Would you serve as an 
executioner were the death penalty reimposed?" If aborters were com-
pared with non-aborters relative to the above construal of the Judeo-
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Christian ethic, overall, of 56 statistically significant differences or ten-
dencies, in 55, aborters scored as more evil or less good than non-
aborters! 
If we examine men who claim to have "killed or to have partici-
pated in killing other humans" and compare them to men who claim 
otherwise, we would have another rough test of the possible linkage 
between abortion, capital punishment, and militarism (over three-
fourths of those who answered "yes" to the question said it was due 
to participation in war). In three of the waves of the study, "killers" 
more frequently than non-killers registered as favoring more liberal 
abortion policies. In two of the waves the killers more frequently 
indicated support for reimposition of the death penalty, and in two 
of the waves killers more fequently said they would serve as execu-
tioners. Making the same test of killers vs. non-killers vis-a-vis the 
Judeo-Christian ethic, of 52 statistically significant differences or ten-
dencies, killers logged as more evil or less good in 48. 
Abortion and Capital Punishment 
It is extremely unfortunate that some questions about "defense" 
and war were not included in our questionnaire so that the pure 
pacifist position could have received a more adequate test. However, 
the results we obtained provide at least a "glimmer" of what might 
await a more complete study. 
The conservative contention that while abortion and capital punish-
ment both involve the taking of human life, the value of the innocent 
life as unrelated or even negatively related to the ethical value of the 
felon's life received little support. First, for the sample as a whole, 
those who were most opposed to abortion were also those most apt to 
be opposed to capital punishment. Second, while in the aggregate 
Christians were more frequently endorsing of capital punishment than 
secularists, the most devout of the Christians "voted" essentially as 
the secularists on the issue. If we accept that the devout of a move-
ment are the major carriers and expressers of "the faith," then Chris-
tianity's "best" are more apt to be against both abortion and capital 
punishment. Further, that aborters should register somewhat more 
frequently for capital punishment poses no small problem about 
"bedfellows." While some humans in the past obviously sought out 
the company of women who aborted, it appears unlikely that many 
conservatives would enjoy doing so today. So from the perspective of 
general morality (as represented by the total sample's responses) or 
Judeo-Christian morality, there is a positive correlation between being 
against abortion and being against capital punishment. 
The liberal argument that the life of the criminal represents 
denotably "real humanity" while the life of the fetus is merely vege-
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tative received small buttressing. For the sample as a whole, those who 
were most oppossed to capital punishment were also those most apt to 
be opposed to abortion. Perhaps the theoreticians of liberalism can 
manage the mental gymnastics requisite to separating these kinds of 
human life, but most people do not. True, the secularists, if they 
represent "liberalism's best" were the most set against capital punish-
ment. But the "archest" of the arch reactionary Christian philosophy 
were as fierce in their opposition. Further, the secularists tested out as 
less noble in just about every other area. Then there is the matter of 
the aborters. These are the recipients of liberalism's attentions. 
Liberalism "owns" them, for weal or woe. The ownership may be "of 
necessity and in sorrow," but there they are - a moral embarrassment 
at best and a sad testimony to liberal circumlocutions regarding "real" 
human life. 
The pacifist position which links all forms of violence against 
humanity, whether abortion, capital punishment, or militarism, fared 
best of the lot. To be sure, the linkages were modest, and many 
relationships which might be expected simply did not emerge (i.e., 
"killers" often did not register as less good or more evil than non-
killers and the same was true for aborters). But all-in-all, considering 
that pacifism tends toward "ownership" of both the non-aborters and 
the non-killers, the results most frequently resonated with pacific phil-
osophy. Secular pacific theoreticians may find more than a casual 
interest in the "high pacifist marks" earned by the very devout Chris-
tians and the "low marks" registered by secularists in every area but 
capital punishment. While everyone attempts not to "throw the baby 
out with the bath," expecting secular pacifism to generate much moral 
power may reflect just such an event. 
As Karl Marx contended that "Everybody knows what freedom is," 
I would suggest that "Everybody knows what the good is." As its 
offering toward the good, liberalism champions the life of the felon -
a human life. But in the U.S., were liberalism to "save" every probable 
victim from execution, only the lives of a few hundred a year could be 
presented as a moral oblation. Behind its back, liberalism would hide 
the 11h to 2 million bleeding innocents. Since worldwide abortion 
probably accounts for about 20 million deaths per year and capital 
punishment for perhaps a few thousand, there is little doubt that from 
the Judeo-Christian perspective, conservatism has taken the better 
course. Were conservatives to make abortion illegal, perhaps half of 
the abortions would not be obtained. Yet few would feel comfortable 
in offering "a lesser evil" as token of good intent. And those who have 
participated in the legalized taking of human life have not been 
"added in." Both conservatism and liberalism share the killer's bed 
and Armageddon would render the saving of either the millions or the 
thousands superfluous. 
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